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Global quantum secure communication can be achieved using quantum key distribution (QKD)
with orbiting satellites. Established techniques use attenuated lasers as weak coherent pulse (WCP)
sources, with so-called decoy-state protocols, to generate the required single-photon-level pulses.
While such approaches are elegant, they come at the expense of attainable final key due to inherent
multi-photon emission, thereby constraining secure key generation over the high-loss, noisy channels
expected for satellite transmissions. In this work we improve on this limitation by using true
single-photon pulses generated from a semiconductor quantum dot (QD) embedded in a nanowire,
possessing low multi-photon emission (< 10−6) and an extraction system efficiency of −15 dB (or
3.1%). Despite the limited efficiency, the key generated by the QD source is greater than that
generated by a WCP source under identical repetition rate and link conditions representative of a
satellite pass. We predict that with realistic improvements of the QD extraction efficiency to −4.0 dB
(or 40%), the quantum-dot QKD protocol outperforms WCP-decoy-state QKD by almost an order
of magnitude. Consequently, a QD source could allow generation of a secure key in conditions where
a WCP source would simply fail, such as in the case of high channel losses. Our demonstration is
the first specific use case that shows a clear benefit for QD-based single-photon sources in secure
quantum communication, and has the potential to enhance the viability and efficiency of satellite-
based QKD networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] such as the
seminal BB84 protocol [3] generates unconditionally se-
cure keys between two distant parties by transmitting en-
coded photons. While terrestrial implementations have
limited range due to inherent channel losses, implemen-
tations with orbiting satellites can extend the range of
QKD across the globe [4, 5]. However, key generation is
diminished by high transmission loss, noise, limited con-
tact time, and imperfections [6, 7]. In particular, when
employing a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source, the se-
cure key length is hampered to account for multi-photon
emissions which leak information [8–10], to the extent
that a given pass of a QKD satellite might not yield any
usable secure key. Because the cost of a QKD platform in
orbit is substantial and only offers limited access time to
a ground station, improvements to the rate of secure key
generation are crucial for the platform’s viability. While
channel performance is limited by telescope apertures
and atmospheric quality, the use of true single-photon
sources to eliminate information leakage could improve
satellite QKD transfer. This is now feasible given re-
cent advances of single-photon emitter devices. Here,
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we study QKD using single-photon pulses generated by
a semiconductor quantum dot (QD) [11] embedded in a
photonic nanowire (see, e.g., [12]) that ensures efficient
and directional light extraction[13] and as well as high
pulse rate and purity [14, 15]. Such devices could be ex-
cellent candidates for a ground-to-satellite uplink imple-
mentation, such as the Canadian QEYSSat mission [16],
where the sizeable cryogenics and pump lasers required
to operate the QD are located on ground.
While the development of single-photon sources using
semiconductor quantum dots has progressed steadily in
recent years, their benefit for QKD has yet to be clearly
demonstrated. Previous proof-of-concept studies demon-
strated that QKD with QD sources could generate keys
up to the sifting step [17–19]. Here, we theoretically
and experimentally compare the QKD performance of
a QD source and a WCP source, focusing on a regime of
high channel loss and including finite-size effects, where
statistical estimates possess significant uncertainty (and
thereby impact secure key length) due to small sample
sizes. We estimate secure key rates using the formalism
of Ref. 20 for QD QKD, after taking practical coupling
losses with the QD into account [21, 22], and the decoy-
state model of Refs. 8–10, and 23 for WCP QKD. Note
that, to provide a fair comparison of the two sources,
we model our calculations assuming the same pulse rep-
etition rates, as well as the same realistic conditions for
satellite-based QKD links, including channel losses of 25
to 35 dB, fly-by pass duration of 100 s, and background
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2photon noise rate of several 100 Hz. We believe our study
is the first of its kind that demonstrates a quantum dot
single-photon source can substantially enhance the per-
formance of a BB84 QKD protocol under such satellite-
link conditions.
II. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Our experimental apparatus is shown in Fig. 1. The
optical source, QD or WCP, is coupled into multi-mode
fiber. The transmitting party, Alice, utilizes a po-
larizer and a half-wave plate in a motorized rotating
stage to encode one of four equally-distributed linear
polarizations—horizontal (H), diagonal (D), vertical (V),
or anti-diagonal (A)—onto each photon pulse from the
selected source. The photons then pass through atten-
uators emulating channel loss before passing through
the free-space channel to the receiver. The receiving
party, Bob, uses a beam splitter and polarizing beam
splitters to discriminate the four polarization states with
passive choice of measurement basis—the passive-basis-
choice design is generally favourable for a satellite pay-
load as it avoids active elements which are more likely to
fail in orbit [10].
Alice’s photons enter Bob’s receiver through a focus-
ing lens (L1, diameter 50 mm, focal length 250 mm),
and a collimating lens (L2, diameter 5 mm, focal length
11 mm). The collimated beam of . 2 mm diameter then
passes through a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), and polariza-
tion beam splitters (PBS1HV(DA) and PBS2HV(DA)) are
placed in HV(DA) arm (PBS2 suppresses noise due to
comparatively low polarization extinction ratio in the re-
flected path of PBS1). Lenses (L3) in each of the four
polarized outputs focus the beams into four multi-mode
fibers connected to single-photon detectors. The times of
detection pulses are recorded using a time-tagging sys-
tem.
Link parameters are chosen following the study of
satellite QKD in Ref. 6. For each source, we record a
series of pulses in each channel transmission loss value,
one polarization at a time, for 100 s each, which is a
typical usable link time of a satellite in low Earth orbit.
The key generation rate is determined using the average
observed statistics of each polarization.
III. QUANTUM DOT QKD
We utilize a single-photon signal from a wurtzite in-
dium arsenide phosphide (InAsP) quantum dot, em-
bedded in a tapered Indium Phosphide (InP) nanowire
[14, 15]. Non-resonant, or incoherent, pulsed pump-
ing is used to excite the quantum dot, effectively re-
leasing carriers above the bandgap of the wurtzite-InP
nanowire bandgap transition. The photoluminescence
spectrum of the quantum dot, Fig. 2, is captured under
off-resonance excitation by 830 nm laser pulses from a ti-
tanium:sapphire (Ti:sapph) mode-locked laser at 420 nW
power and 76.4 MHz repetition rate. The quantum dot
emits exciton photons at 892.67 nm and biexciton pho-
tons at 894.2 nm. To separate these two emission lines,
we send the quantum dot emission to a polarization-
independent transmission grating with 1504 grooves per
millimetre. The photons from the excitonic emission are
coupled to a multi-mode optical fiber and sent to the
QKD state preparation apparatus—these are chosen as
they have a higher rate than those from the biexciton
emission (see Fig. 2). The QD source has an internal loss
of about 15 dB due to imperfect photon generation and
collection, resulting in an effective pulse rate of 2.6 MHz.
For QKD security analysis we assume that the phases
of each photon pulse are independent, which is a good ap-
proximation for QD single photon pulses [24], while any
residual phase could be erased by randomizing the pump
phase [25]. A secure implementation of a QKD source
requires fast, random polarization encoding. This could
be achieved by multiple methods, including direct [25] or
on-chip phase modulation, fast external electro-optical
phase modulators (typical insertion loss of 4 dB at repe-
tition rates of 10 GHz [26]) or passively combining four
QDs with dedicated polarization orientations and switch-
ing of the excitation laser pulse to address a random QD
at each time slot (insertion loss of 3 dB, repetition rates
at GHz levels). For our demonstration we use slow vari-
ation of the polarization encoding based on a motorized
wave-plate.
A low multi-photon emission probability is most criti-
cal for a secure QKD implementation. Impressively, the
nanowire quantum dot source has a measured second-
order correlation g2(0) ≈ 0.015 when excited off-
resonance (see Fig. 3). Although in semiconductor quan-
tum optics there is a special emphasis placed on the mea-
surement of the g2(0), recently it has been shown that
g2(0) < 1/2 does not provide the exact probability of
single- or multi-photon emission [27] but only suggests a
non-zero single-photon contribution in the quantum state
of the light. This means that even at a low g2(0) the
source may emit a small fraction of multi-photon pulses,
which could permit an adversary to perform a photon
number splitting attack and potentially gain information
about the key.
To suppress information leakage due to multi-photon
emission from the QD, we use the key rate equation for
BB84 QKD with an imperfect photon source [28, 29],
LQD ≥ nqA
(
1−H
(
E˜
A
)
− fH(E)−∆
)
, (1)
where n is the number of raw key bits, q = 1/2 is the sift-
ing ratio, and E is the observed quantum bit error ratio
(QBER). E˜ = E + 12
√{2 ln(1/εPE) + 2 ln(m+ 1)}(1/m)
takes into account the chance that the QBER estimated
from a sifted key of size m = qn deviates from the actual
value [20, 30, 31], and εPE is the probability that such
deviation occurs. H(x) = −x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x)
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FIG. 1. Experimental apparatus. For QD QKD, the QD is excited with a mode-locked titanium:sapphire (Ti:sapph) laser.
A grating and a wedge mirror are used to separate exciton pulses from bi-exciton pulses. The photons are then sent to the
QKD system. For WCP QKD, photon pulses are sent directly from the Ti:sapph laser to the QKD system. At Alice, the
signal polarization is first cleaned up with a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and then encoded through a motorized half-wave
plate (HWP). Attenuators (Att) are used to simulate channel loss, as well as to select intensity levels for the decoy-state WCP
protocol. The signal is sent through a free-space quantum channel and measured by a passive basis choice polarization-encoding
QKD receiver at Bob (see text for details).
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FIG. 2. Observed emission spectrum of the QD excited at
830 nm, i.e., above bandgap non-resonant excitation. The
spectrum shows three peaks attributed to the exciton (X),
biexciton (XX), and charged exciton or trion (T ). The
spectrum is measured by an imaging spectrometer using a
1200 grooves/mm grating.
is the binary Shannon entropy, and fH(E) is informa-
tion leakage during error correction with error correction
code efficiency f . A correction term,
∆ = −7m
√
1
m
log2
2
ε˜
− 2 log2
1
εPA
− log2
2
εEC
(2)
accounts for statistical deviations due to finite-size ef-
-20-40-60
FIG. 3. Measured autocorrelation histogram of photon emis-
sion from the QD. The data are presented without any back-
ground corrections.
fects [8–10, 23], with security parameter ε = ε˜+εPA+εEC.
In this experiment, we choose εEC = 10
−10, and ε˜ and
εPA are numerically optimized for the key size under the
constraint 1 − εEC > ε˜ > εPA ≥ 0. The correction term
A = (pdet − Pm)/pdet accounts for an adversary’s infor-
mation due to multi-photon pulses [28, 29], where pdet
is the probability of detection and Pm is the probability
of a multi-photon pulse generated by Alice per time slot.
Because the photon number distribution of the quantum
dot emission is not precisely known, and certainly cannot
be presumed to follow that of the coherent state, we em-
4ploy an alternative method to establish an upper bound
for Pm.
First, from the QKD data recorded in Bob’s apparatus,
we determine the likelihood for a three-way coincidence
detection, where more than two detectors ‘click’ within
the same time window (5 ns), to be less than 10−9. This
probability is similar to accidental coincidences caused
from background noise in the channel and dark counts
from the detectors, and implies that source contributions
of three of more photons is negligible—we thus do not
consider those further.
The remaining two-photon contributions are charac-
terized with the help of a 50:50 beam splitter, where
each output is coupled to an APD, at coupling efficiency
ηt = 10% and APD detection efficiency of ηd = 60%.
The experiment is run for a duration of 10 hours to ob-
tain sufficient probability of coincident clicks, C, in a
5 ns window. With emission of i-photon Fock-states at
probabilities given by pi, the probability for a 2-fold co-
incidence is
C =
1
2
p2η
2 +O(ηD) +O(D2) (3)
= NC/N, (4)
where the detection efficiency of the testing device is
given by η = ηtηd, D is the dark count probability, NC is
the total number of coincident detections, and N is the
number of time slots during 10 hours of data collection.
We similarly also determine the probability of ‘solitary’
events S where only one detector clicks within the win-
dow,
S = p1η + p2η(
3
2
− η) +O(D) (5)
= NS/N, (6)
where NS is number of solitary detections over the data
collection period. In this setup the probability of dark
count per detection event is lower than 10−7 per detec-
tion. Thus, the contribution of dark counts to C and S
is negligible. By combining Eq. (4) and Eq. (6), we find
p2 =
2κp1
η − 3κ+ 2κη , (7)
where κ ≡ C/S is calculated from the measurement data.
Under the assumption that higher photon terms can be
neglected, we arrive at a bound for Pm,
Pm ≤ 2κR
η − 3κ+ 2κη , (8)
where the probability of non-empty pulses R = p1+p2 ≥
p1 can be measured directly from the source. From our
measurements, we find κ = 1.1 × 10−5, η = 0.06, and
R = 0.033, and with Eq. (8) we determine the probability
of multi-photon emission to be Pm ≤ 4.5× 10−6.
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FIG. 4. Secret key size over 100 s exchange, including finite-
size effects, for varying channel loss. Symbols indicate ex-
perimental results, lines theoretical. Red circles and dashed
line, WCP QKD with 76.4 MHz; green pluses and line, QD
QKD with 76.4 MHz excitation frequency and 15 dB inter-
nal loss; blue line, extrapolation of 76.4 MHz QD QKD to
4.0 dB internal loss; black dashed line, extrapolation of WCP
QKD to 300 MHz; light-blue line, extrapolation of QD QKD
to 300 MHz excitation and 4.0 dB internal loss.
IV. WEAK COHERENT PULSED QKD
We compare the QD to a WCP source using the decoy-
state BB84 protocol, which employs multiple intensity
levels to counter photon number splitting attacks. The
WCP source is realized using pulses from a Ti:sapph
mode-locked laser, attenuated to a mean photon number
of µ = 0.5 per signal pulse and ν = 0.1 per decoy pulse.
Note that because the optical pulses from a Ti:sapph
laser have a phase relation, they are not directly suitable
for secure QKD without phase randomization. (We omit
this step for simplicity.)
The estimated key length of decoy-state BB84 QKD
with two intensity levels is
LWCP ≥ nKµq
[
Y L1 (1−H(EU1 ))−QµfH(Eµ)−Qµ∆/nµ
]
,
(9)
where n is the total number of transmitted pulses, nµ
is the number of detected signal pulses, Qµ is the gain
of the signal state, Y L1 is the lower bound of the single-
photon gain, EU1 is the upper bound of the QBER with
a correction for the finite-size effects on decoy state char-
acterization [23], Kµ = 0.9 is a fraction of the pulses that
are in a signal state, and ∆ is a correction term for finite-
size effects [20, 30, 31]. Other parameters are as for the
QD source.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experimental and theoretical results are shown in
Fig. 4. With an observed QBER of ≈2%, the QD QKD
system can effectively tolerate channel loss up to ≈27 dB
(green line in Fig. 4). This tolerable loss of the QD QKD
system is notably higher than the WCP protocol with the
5same repetition rate (red dashed line) despite its high in-
ternal loss of 15 dB.
The performance of a QD QKD system will be further
enhanced by realistic improvements to the source’s inter-
nal losses. Other demonstrations of QD sources [32, 33]
have reported an optimistic 4.0 dB (or 60%) internal loss,
owing to a 50% fiber coupling efficiency and an 80% prac-
tical photon generation efficiency. Such improved inter-
nal coupling of the source brings the loss tolerance of the
system up to 32 dB (blue line in Fig. 4), even surpass-
ing a decoy-state QKD system with 300 MHz repetition
rate (black dashed line). Finally, assuming QD uses high-
efficiency coupling and is also operated at the 300 MHz
rate (light blue line), our extrapolation predicts the QD
QKD could tolerate significantly higher channel loss—
close to 37 dB—than a WCP QKD (32 dB), or generate
up to one order of magnitude higher key length per 100 s
satellite pass, significantly outperforming the WCP QKD
system under the same channel conditions. The gener-
ation of the four QKD states from a QD emitter may
introduce internal losses of 3 to 4 dB due to insertion
losses from electro-optic modulators or passive coupling,
and the key generation rates in would be proportionally
lower. However, the advantage of QD QKD over WCP
QKD still holds.
VI. CONCLUSION
We experimentally and theoretically compared the per-
formance of QD and WCP QKD under finite-size effects
for the purposes of secure communication in constrained
channels such as with satellites. In particular, we devised
a novel method to characterize and determine the upper
bound of multi-photon emissions from a QD emitter, and
include finite-size effects due to the limited link duration
of about 100 s expected for a satellite contact. Remark-
ably, our results show that a QD QKD system operated
at 76.4 MHz repetition rate, and despite 15 dB inter-
nal loss, outperforms a decoy-state WCP QKD running
at the same repetition rate, especially at high channel
transmission loss. The performance of QD QKD could
be improved further by reducing the internal loss, and at
an optimistic, but still practical 4.0 dB the performance
advantage for a QD system is almost an order of magni-
tude better than WCP. This QD sample was driven by
an off-resonant excitation scheme, and future work using
resonant excitation could reduce the multi-photon emis-
sion even further as well as improve timing jitter and
repetition rate of the emitted photon pulses.
State-of-the-art quantum dots coupled to microcavities
have shown lifetimes of ≈60 ps [34], and can be driven
on resonance by a GHz-rate pulsed laser. This is equiv-
alent to the current clock rate used in high-speed WCP
QKD [35–37]. Utilizing quantum dot sources in satellite-
uplink-based QKD is very appealing, because the bulky
components, such as the cryogenic system for the single-
photon source, are located on the ground station. Note,
however, the wavelength of single-photon pulses in this
study (≈890 nm) is not optimal for the satellite uplink
[6]. Further study on other quantum dot materials that
emit at better wavelengths, or the possibility of using
frequency conversion of the quantum dot single-photon
source, is needed.
The narrow-band emission of QD is suited well for fil-
ters used in very light-polluted, or even daylight, envi-
ronments. In addition, QD devices have the potential to
generate entangled photon pairs, or even produce multi-
plexed emission, all of which could be helpful for inter-
connecting multiple users and enhancing the QKD rates
in the future. Our theoretical analysis should be applica-
ble to QKD systems with other single-photon emitters,
and we believe our study can help spark interest in the
advancements of QKD with true single-photon sources.
As secure communication over long and global distances
becomes more important than ever, the enhancement of
satellite QKD using true single-photon emitters is antic-
ipated to have a major contribution to help make this
happen. Our findings demonstrate that a quantum dot
can indeed be a viable and beneficial photon emitter in
a QKD system.
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